SecureBoot Toolkit
Hardened libraries for secure boot, key management, and attestation.
Security work on embedded hardware tends to arrive late, usually when a customer’s questionnaire asks how firmware is signed. Retrofitting a boot chain at that point is expensive, and the answer is nearly always the same set of pieces.
The toolkit is those pieces, hardened and ready to integrate: image signing with RSA or ECC, a verified boot chain from bootloader to application, mutual TLS so both ends of a connection prove who they are, and an HSM wrapper so private keys stay in hardware and never enter a build artefact. It is designed to go in at architecture time, when it costs days rather than months.
Secure boot chain
Each stage verifies the next before handing over control.
RSA / ECC image signing
Signing that fits an existing build pipeline instead of replacing it.
HSM integration
Keys stay in hardware. No private key ever reaches a developer machine.
Mutual TLS library
Device and server each authenticate the other, with rotation built in.
Anti-rollback
A device will not accept an older, vulnerable image.
Attestation hooks
A device can prove what it is running when asked.
Establish the root
Keys generated in the HSM, public half fused or provisioned to the device.
Sign at build time
The pipeline signs every image it produces, with no manual step.
Verify at boot
The chain refuses anything unsigned, altered or rolled back.
Attest in the field
The device reports its firmware identity to the service it connects to.
Defense & Aerospace
Programmes where firmware provenance has to be demonstrable.
Medical & HealthTech
Regulated devices that must prove the software in the field is the software approved.
Smart Energy
Field equipment that is physically reachable by people you did not vet.
